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THE WAGES OF CRYING JUDICIAL RESTRAINT
RANDY E. BARNETT*

In September 2005, the Wall Street Journal asked if I would
write a tribute to Chief Justice William Rehnquist, who had just
passed away. In thinking about the future of federalism, the
Supreme Court and the Constitution, it is fitting to quote from
that piece. Here is how it begins: “Today we mourn the death
of William Rehnquist. One day soon we may mourn the death
of his legacy—the jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court.”1 And
here is part of how it ends:
As the new chief justice (assuming he is confirmed), will
John Roberts assume the role of his mentor William
Rehnquist—for whom he clerked—and lead the Roberts
Court to enforce the Constitution’s original plan of limited
federal power? . . . . A judicial withdrawal from enforcing
the original limits on the powers of Congress would undo
the New Federalist legacy of William Rehnquist.2

Then there was this comment on President Bush’s choice to fill
Justice O’Connor’s seat on the Court (for which then‐Judge
Alito was eventually selected):
As the president now decides who next to nominate, he
would uphold the Constitution by selecting a person with a
firm and demonstrated commitment to the Rehnquist
Court’s New Federalism legacy. Only such a choice would
continue the movement to restore the ‘first principles’ of
constitutionally limited government that William Rehnquist
* Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Legal Theory, Georgetown University Law
Center. Director, Georgetown Center for the Constitution.
This Essay was adapted from remarks given during a panel discussion of the
2012 Federalist Society National Lawyers Convention held in November 2012 in
Washington, D.C. For an audio and video recording of the complete panel, please
visit the Federalist Society’s website. Federalism and Federal Power, FEDERALIST
SOC’Y (Nov. 19, 2012), http://www.fed‐soc.org/publications/detail/federalism‐and‐
federal‐power‐event‐audiovideo. Permission to copy and distribute this Essay for
nonprofit educational use is hereby granted.
1. Randy E. Barnett, Op‐Ed., William Rehnquist, WALL ST. J., Sept. 6, 2005,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB112596560700032247.html.
2. Id.
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affirmed so eloquently. One can hardly imagine a sadder
end to the tenure of William Rehnquist than that his most
prized and important contribution to constitutional law is
aborted by a conservative Republican president and a Re‐
publican‐controlled Senate.3

So eight years later, where does the New Federalism stand?
After the Affordable Care Act case,4 there is good news and
there is bad news.
First, the good news. Five Justices voted to affirm the propo‐
sition that the Constitution creates a government of limited and
enumerated powers and that the courts will enforce those lim‐
its.5 To understand why this victory was possible, it is im‐
portant to understand that there are not just two versions of
federalism, pre‐New Deal and post‐New Deal. There is also a
third version.6 The failure to recognize the third version goes a
long way to explain why most of my academic colleagues pre‐
dicted that the right would have no chance to prevail in our
constitutional challenge to the individual insurance mandate.7
The first version of federalism is the pre‐New Deal version.
This version affirms that the Constitution established a national
government of limited and enumerated powers, that those
powers should be interpreted according to their original mean‐
ing, and that much of what the federal government tried to do
before the New Deal, and did during the New Deal and after, is
unconstitutional.8 Obviously, something we might call the
3. Id.
4. Nat’l Fed’n Of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
5. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. at 2591–93 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.); id. at 2642–43
(joint dissent). I defend this characterization of the decision in Randy E. Barnett,
Who Won the Obamacare Case (and Why Did So Many Law Professors Miss the Boat)?,
65 FLA. L. REV. (forthcoming).
6. See Randy E. Barnett, Three Federalisms, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 285, 286 (2008)
(exploring the evolution of constitutional federalism from the Founding to the
post‐New Deal era).
7. See, e.g., Over 100 Law Professors Agree on Affordable Care Act’s Constitutionality,
CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/01/pdf/
law_professors_ACA.pdf (last visited Mar. 12, 2012) (noting that legal challenges
to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act “seek to jettison nearly two
centuries of settled constitutional law”). I provide extensive citations to articles by
law professors before the decision dismissing the merits of the challenge in Bar‐
nett, supra note 5.
8. Cf. John F. Manning, Federalism and Constitutional Generality, 122 HARV. L. REV.
2003, 2020–21 (2009) (noting that the pre‐New Deal Court “sought to identify formal
categories separating ‘commerce’ from activities such as manufacturing, to restrict
federal regulation to activities having a ‘direct’ effect upon interstate commerce, and
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“New Deal vision of federalism” supplanted the pre‐New Deal
version, but its exact content is not as obvious as some believe.
The post‐New Deal vision of federalism has been interpreted
by progressives, quite beyond what the Court has actually said,
as repudiating the idea that the Constitution enumerates cer‐
tain limited congressional powers and that these limits are to
be enforced by the courts. This progressive vision of the post‐
New Deal federalism essentially says that Congress has the
plenary power to legislate as it will with respect to the national
economy.9 Put another way, the Commerce and Necessary and
Proper Clauses combine to create a “National Problems Power”
vested in Congress.
Because most law professors held this vision of the New
Deal, it came as quite a shock to them when the Rehnquist
Court established the New Federalism.10 The New Federalism
established the proposition that there were limits that were
compelled by what Chief Justice Rehnquist referred to as “first
principles” of constitutional government.11 That these limits
would be enforced by the Court12 seemingly rejected and repu‐
diated the progressive vision of the post‐New Deal constitu‐
tionalism that, up to that point, had seemed orthodoxy.
But did this New Federalism of the Rehnquist Court go all
the way back to the pre‐New Deal vision of federalism under
to limit the [Commerce Clause] to its apparent purpose of authorizing regulation of
interstate commerce as such (as opposed to regulation of such commerce to achieve
desirable social ends in intrastate matters” (footnotes omitted)).
9. See, e.g., Keith E. Whittington, Taking What They Give Us: Explaining the Court’s
Federalism Offensive, 51 DUKE L.J. 477, 478 (2001) (noting that the post‐New Deal
pre‐Rehnquist Court had, with little exception, “carefully refrained from giving
judicial teeth to the idea that the national government was one of enumerated
powers”); cf. Manning, supra note 8, at 2022 (noting that the New Deal Court
“made clear not only that intrastate activity fell within the Commerce Clause if it
affected interstate commerce, but also that almost any activity, however marginal
to the national economy, could have the requisite effect” on interstate commerce).
10. Cf. Manning, supra note 8, at 2020 (describing the New Federalism as an ef‐
fort by the Court “to reassert constraints on Congress’s Article I powers without
restoring the full array of limitations that it had applied prior to [the Court’s] 1937
acquiescence in the New Deal’s expansion of federal power”).
11. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) (Rehnquist, C.J.)
(“We start with first principles. The Constitution creates a Federal Government of
enumerated powers.” (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3)).
12. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000) (holding that the
Commerce Clause does not empower Congress to create a civil remedy for vic‐
tims of gender‐motivated violence); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559–61 (holding that the
Commerce Clause does not empower Congress to ban the possession of handguns
in school zones).
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which the original meaning of congressional powers listed in
Article I, Section 8 was enforced? Did it even hope to do so?
The thought that the New Federalism represented a return to
the pre‐New Deal vision worried much of the academy.13 In
2005, when Gonzalez v. Raich14 was decided, however, most ac‐
ademics breathed a sigh of relief. “Aha!” they thought. “The
Rehnquist Court is no longer even going to try enforcing the
original limits of the Constitution. We are back to where we
started: the progressive understanding of the New Deal, ac‐
cording to which Congress can do whatever it wants as long as
it has something to do with the national economy.”15
This view, though, was an inaccurate interpretation of what
the Raich case did and what the Rehnquist Court established.
The New Federalism of the Rehnquist Court was a genuinely
new federalism. It was not a return to the pre‐New Deal version
of federalism. Instead, it was an alternative vision of post‐New
Deal constitutionalism—an alternative to the progressive vision.
In place of the progressive vision of “anything goes,” the New
Federalism might be summarized as “this far and no further,”16
provided that this principle is not taken literally to mean that
Congress can never exercise any new power. Rather, this vision
of the New Deal stipulates that everything that the New Deal
and Warren Courts authorized Congress to do remains constitu‐
tional. The Court has accepted that.17 However, if Congress
wants to go beyond what it has done before, if it wants to exer‐
cise a new and unprecedented power, then Congress bears a
13. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, What Is the Supreme Courtʹs New Federalism?, 25 OKLA.
CITY U. L. REV. 927, 927 (2000) (speculating that the Rehnquist Court viewed itself as
being “in a position to restore the . . . relation between the nation and the states” to
the “vision of federalism embodied in the original Constitution”).
14. 545 U.S. 1, 15, 22 (2005) (holding that the Commerce Clause and Necessary and
Proper Clause empower Congress to criminalize the cultivation and possession of
marijuana for medical purposes, despite the existence of a contrary state law).
15. See, e.g., Alex Kreit, Rights, Rules, and Raich, 108 W. VA. L. REV. 705, 719
(2006) (concluding that “Raich turns Lopez’s substantive limitations on what activi‐
ties Congress can constitutionally regulate into procedural limits that Congress
will generally be able to easily overcome”); Glenn H. Reynolds & Brannon P.
Denning, What Hath Raich Wrought? Five Takes, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 915, 932
(2005) (“We are unlikely to see a lower federal court, after Raich, strike down an
act of Congress on Commerce Clause grounds . . . .”).
16. Cf. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613 (Rehnquist, C.J.) (“[T]hus far in our Nation’s his‐
tory our cases have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate activity only
where the activity is economic in nature.”) (emphasis added).
17. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613–18; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556–57 (reaffirming the
continuing validity of landmark New Deal Commerce Clause cases).
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heavy burden to explain why such a new power is justified and
why the principles justifying its creation do not lead to the con‐
clusion that Congress has plenary power over the national econ‐
omy,18 a proposition that the Rehnquist Court rejected.19 The
“this far and no further” approach to federalism is unfortu‐
nate—I prefer the more originalist pre‐New Deal approach—but
it surely beats the progressive vision of “anything goes.”
In sum there are three precepts of the Rehnquist Court’s New
Federalism vision of federal power after the New Deal. First, the
powers already approved by the Court are taken to be settled.
Second, any new power must be justified. Third, any purported
justification must not lead to the progressive vision of an unlim‐
ited and plenary congressional power, but must somehow pre‐
serve the original vision of Article I, Section 8 as establishing a
national government of limited and enumerated powers.
The Affordable Care Act challenges posed the following
question: Was the Roberts Court still prepared to hew to the
“this far and no further” vision of post‐New Deal constitution‐
alism? Or had a majority finally accepted the law professor’s
“anything goes” interpretation of the New Deal that gave Con‐
gress a plenary and unlimited power over the national econo‐
my? To the shock and dismay of many law professors, the liti‐
gation revealed that the Rehnquist Court’s vision of the New
Federalism is still alive, and in fact pretty well. We learned that
there are still five votes for the proposition that Congress’s
commerce power is limited, that the Necessary and Proper
Clause is not a carte blanche to get around the limits of the
Commerce Clause, and that the courts are in a position to draw
a line and say, “this far and no further.”20
Because the individual insurance mandate was a literally
unprecedented claim of congressional power, the government
bore a genuine burden to justify this claim of power by pre‐
senting a rationale that was not going to lead to vesting an un‐
limited amount of power in Congress.21 Because it failed to
meet that burden, the government lost on this particular issue
presented by the case. This was a huge victory. After National
18. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562–64, 567–68.
19. See id. at 567–68.
20. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2591–93 (2012) (opin‐
ion of Roberts, C.J.); id. at 2642–43 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
21. Id. at 2586 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.); id. at 2647–48 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas,
& Alito, JJ., dissenting).
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Federation of Independent Business, law professors can no longer
assert that current doctrine comports with the “anything goes”
approach to the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses,
as they had prior to the lawsuit.
But, while the really good news was the reaffirmation and
extension of the New Federalism, the really bad news was the
outcome of the case upholding most of Obamacare. Although
five Justices were able to identify a line beyond which Con‐
gress may not go, and to find that a statute mandating that in‐
dividuals enter into a contractual relationship with a private
company crossed that line, the Court largely upheld the Af‐
fordable Care Act.22
To reach this result, the Chief Justice adopted what he called
a “saving construction.” Instead of invalidating the statute as it
had been enacted, he decided to rewrite the Affordable Care
Act’s text and to eliminate the mandatory “requirement” part
of Section 5000A, leaving only the “penalty,” which he then re‐
characterized as a tax because it was so modest as to lack a pu‐
nitive character. He then upheld this substantially rewritten
provision as constitutional.23
Why did this happen and what does this mean going for‐
ward? To answer these questions, we must distinguish be‐
tween “judicial conservatism” and the position that might be
called “constitutional conservatism.” Simply put, judicial con‐
servatism is the doctrine of judicial restraint. It is the idea that
judges should defer to the popularly elected branches of gov‐
ernment in deciding on the scope of governmental powers.
Professor James Bradley Thayer advanced perhaps the strong‐
est formulation of judicial deference, contending that a statute
should be invalidated only when its unconstitutionality is “so
clear that it is not open to rational question.”24 In National Fed‐
eration of Independent Business, Chief Justice Roberts observed
that “‘[p]roper respect for a coordinate branch of the govern‐
ment’ requires that [the Court] strike down an Act of Congress
only if ‘the lack of constitutional authority to pass [the] act in
22. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111‐148, 124 Stat.
119 (2010).
23. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2594–98 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.);
see also Barnett, supra note 5 (explaining in greater detail the way in which Chief
Justice Roberts “saved” the statute by revising it).
24. See James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitu‐
tional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 144 (1893).
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question is clearly demonstrated.’”25 Judicial conservatism,
which advocates judicial restraint, has been favored by many in
the Federalist Society, and by other conservatives, for as long
as there has been a Federalist Society.
The constitutional conservative alternative—which fortu‐
nately enjoys an increasing popular valence these days—is that
the Constitution limits all three branches of the federal gov‐
ernment, and that it is the duty of the judiciary to enforce those
limits against the other two branches—a duty from which it
should not shrink.26 In contrast with judicial conservatism’s
preoccupation with “judicial restraint,” constitutional conserv‐
atism endorses “judicial engagement.”27
So what did we learn from this particular lawsuit? First, we
learned five conservative Justices are not enough. If you only
have five votes, there is a very good likelihood that, if the pres‐
sure is turned up sufficiently high, someone is going to break.
We had to run the table in this case. We had to get a unani‐
mous vote of the only five votes that were willing to entertain
the principle that there are limits on federal power and that
Congress had exceeded these limits in this case. We had to get
a unanimous vote of the five Justices who were actually listen‐
ing to this part of the argument, and we failed to get a unani‐
mous vote. So we learned that five votes are not enough.
But there is a second lesson for some members of the Feder‐
alist Society to consider carefully. Should you not reconsider
your rhetorical and substantive commitment to judicial re‐
straint? After all, did not judicial restraint provide one Justice
with an excuse for failing to enforce the line that even he
acknowledged existed? In National Federation of Independent
Business, four Justices adhered to their duty to uphold the
enumerated limits imposed by the Constitution on the Con‐
gress, at least as interpreted through this New Federalism vi‐

25. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2579 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (third al‐
teration in original) (quoting United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 635 (1883)).
26. See, e.g., Hettinga v. United States, 677 F.3d 471, 481 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (Brown,
J., concurring) (“The judiciary has worried incessantly about the
‘countermajoritarian difficulty’ when interpreting the Constitution. But the better
view may be that the Constitution created the countermajoritarian difficulty in
order to thwart more potent threats to the Republic . . . .”).
27. See Randy E. Barnett, Judicial Engagement Through the Lens of Lee Optical, 19
GEO. MASON L. REV. 845 (2012). See generally Symposium on Judicial Engagement, 19
GEO. MASON L. REV. 845–1070 (2012).
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sion of “this far and no further.”28 Because the Chief Justice was
not prepared to do that, however, he looked for an out.29
The philosophy of judicial conservatism with its doctrine of
judicial restraint gave him the out he sought, a cloak that al‐
lowed him to “save” the statute in the name of deferring to the
popularly elected Congress.30 That is the irony, of course. Be‐
cause of his vote, the Court ended up deferring to a Congress
and an enactment that was so unpopular that the House of
Representatives switched parties in no small measure because
of it.31
Going forward, consider whether “judicial restraint” is really
the judicial philosophy that the Federalist Society wants to ad‐
vocate. Perhaps instead we want Justices who not only profess
a belief in the principles of federalism and limited and enumer‐
ated powers, but also have the character and the fortitude to
enforce these principles in the face of withering public pressure
by the media and intelligentsia.32
In National Federation of Independent Business, we saw what it
looks like when four Justices will do just that. But, unfortunate‐
ly, we lacked the fifth vote. In the future, Congress and the Ex‐
ecutive must be prudent in who they favor to fill these judicial
roles. We need “constitutional conservative” judges who un‐
derstand that their proper role is to stand with the people, not
with Congress, by enforcing the constraints contained in the
law that was enacted by the people to limit the powers of those
28. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2642–43 (joint dissent).
29. See Jan Crawford, Roberts Switched Views to Uphold Health Care Law, CBS
NEWS (July 1, 2012), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301‐3460 16257464549/roberts‐
switchedviews‐to‐uphold‐health‐care‐law/.
30. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2593–94 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.)
(construing the individual mandate as imposing a tax after invoking the canon of
constitutional avoidance and giving the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act “the full measure of deference owed to federal statutes”).
31. In the month that the Court decided Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., a Gallup poll
pegged Congress’s approval rating at 17%. See Frank Newport, Congress Approval
at 17% in June, GALLUP, June 11, 2012, http://www.gallup.com/
poll/155144/Congress‐Approval‐June.aspx. One week after the Court upheld the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, a Gallup poll showed that 46% of
Americans believed that the Act would hurt the economy, while only 37%
thought the Act would help it. See Frank Newport, Americans See More Economic
Harm Than Good in Health Law, GALLUP, July 5, 2012, http://www.gallup.com/
poll/155513/Americans‐Economic‐Harm‐Good‐Health‐Law.aspx.
32. See Randy E. Barnett, The Disdain Campaign, 126 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 1 (2012)
(describing the vociferous campaign waged against the conservative justices in gen‐
eral, and Chief Justice Roberts in particular, after the case was submitted).
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who govern us. We need judges with the judicial character to
withstand the opprobrium of the Harvard Law School faculty,
the editorial board of the New York Times, and even of Jeffrey
Rosen. Otherwise, the New Federalism legacy of William
Rehnquist that I described upon his death will in fact expire.
But not yet. Not yet. In National Federation of Independent Busi‐
ness v. Sebelius, we have moved the ball far forward from where
it was upon his demise,33 though we still have a long way to go.

33. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2586–87 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.)
(observing that “[t]he power to regulate commerce presupposes the existence of
commercial activity to be regulated” and that the Act’s individual mandate “does
not regulate existing commercial activity. It instead compels individuals to become
active in commerce . . . on the ground that their failure to do so affects interstate
commerce”); see also id. at 2648 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting)
(noting that “forgo[ing] participation in an interstate market is not itself commer‐
cial activity . . . within Congress’ power to regulate” under the Commerce
Clause); see also Barnett, supra note 5 (explaining how the doctrine established in
NFIB moved constitutional law in a positive direction).

